Sustainability and bank risk by Scholtens, Lambertus Johannes Regnerus & Van 't Klooster, Sophie
ARTICLE
Sustainability and bank risk
Bert Scholtens1 & Sophie van’t Klooster 1
ABSTRACT Banks play a key role in society and are crucial for economic development. The
existing literature ﬁnds a positive association between bank performance and sustainability,
but tends to neglect the risk dimension. As human-driven processes interact with global
social-ecological connectivity and exhibit cross-scale relationships, we investigate whether
sustainability affects banks’ individual default risk and their systemic risk, that is, their con-
tribution to the risk of the ﬁnancial system. As banks are ﬁnancial intermediaries and there is
no direct measure of their sustainability, we proxy for sustainability with banks’ performance
on environmental, social, and governance attributes, especially their policies and perfor-
mance. We control for relevant bank, market and country characteristics. It shows that higher
sustainability scores of banks signiﬁcantly associate with lower default risk. We also establish
that outperformance on sustainability reduces banks’ contribution to systemic risk. Thus, it
appears that banks’ sustainability performance can spill over to the ﬁnancial system. This
implies sustainability is material for banks and their supervisors. Accounting for sustainability
can augment bank risk management and prudential policy decision making, and provide
guidance as to how to ﬁnance a transition towards an economic system that effectively
internalizes externalities.
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Introduction
Banks play a central and crucial role in society and theymediate capital and assets between surplus and deﬁcitspending households throughout the economy (Cull et al.,
2013). As such, they bear great responsibility for sustainable
development (Scholtens, 2017; Galaz et al., 2018). Mark Carney,
governor of the Bank of England, points out that especially cli-
mate change is a huge concern for the ﬁnancial industry (Carney,
2015). However, so far, bank management and banking super-
visors do not explicitly account for sustainability and responsi-
bility of banks. We want to ﬁnd out if this omission is material
from a risk perspective. In this respect, we account not only for
banks’ default risk, but for the risk of the ﬁnancial system as well.
It is important from an academic and societal point of view to
examine the relationship between sustainability and (systemic)
bank risk because the potential consequences of cross-scale sys-
temic environmental risks with global effects are increasing
(Homer-Dixon et al., 2015; Keys et al., 2019). In particular, it
becomes increasingly clear that human-driven processes interact
with global social-ecological connectivity and exhibit cross-scale
relationships (Galaz et al., 2018). Then, it is relevant to study how
this works out in the case of banking, which plays such a crucial
role in society (Berger et al., 2017).
Most research focuses on how sustainability relates to the costs
and revenues of ﬁrms (Schröder, 2014; Friede et al., 2015). The
main ﬁnding from this literature is that there is a small but positive
association between the two. It also shows that most of the literature
does not distinct between industries. However, different industries
relate in quite different ways to sustainability due to variation in
their production structure and in their position in the economic
value chain (Heal, 2008; Dafermos et al., 2018). Further, sustain-
ability is hard to measure at the ﬁrm or industry level (Chatterji
et al., 2009; Semenova and Hassel, 2015; Capelle-Blancard et al.,
2019). Some scholars argue the ﬁnancial sector should play a crucial
role in the transformation of the current economic system to a
more sustainable one (Kemp-Benedict, 2018). This implies
accounting for sustainability in order to reduce the external
(unpriced) economic effects of production (Heal, 2008).
Given the mounting evidence of the importance of sustain-
ability on ﬁrm performance (Margolis et al., 2009; Friede et al.,
2015; Ferrell et al., 2016), it is highly surprising that there is little
knowledge about how it inﬂuences banks’ default risk: the risk of
a bank being unable to fulﬁll its obligations of repaying its debt.
This is important as default risk not only affects the bank itself,
but also may inﬂuence the entire ﬁnancial system. There are few
studies that explicitly consider default risk of banks in relation to
sustainability. These studies suggest that there appears to be a
neutral or negative relationship between the two (Boutin-
Dufresne and Savaria, 2004; Bouslah et al., 2018). However,
because of the importance of human-environment interactions
(Keys et al., 2019), we also want to account for the so-called
systemic risk of the banking industry. In this respect, systemic
risk is the risk resulting from bank operations for the ﬁnancial
system as a whole (Beale et al. 2011; Acharya et al., 2012; Laeven
et al., 2016; Berger et al., 2017). Homer-Dixon et al. (2015) argue
that crises will increasingly arise from the conjunction of three
underlying, long-term, and causally linked global trends. These
are the sheer scale of human activity in relation to Earth’s
resources, the rise in interconnectivity, and the increasing
homogeneity, or declining diversity, of human cultures, institu-
tions, practices, and technologies (Homer-Dixon et al., 2015).
Therefore, we investigate if and how sustainability relates to
banks’ default risk and their systemic risk.
We show that banks with high sustainability scores (i.e., those
who perform relatively well) have lower default risk, as well as
lower contribution to ﬁnancial system risk. Especially the social
dimension of sustainability appears to be important. This may be
due to the nature of bank services, which to a great extent rely on
information production and processing, as well as social net-
works. The ﬁndings suggest that both banks and ﬁnancial
authorities should extend the scope of their risk analysis and
management and explicitly account for information about how
banks interact with sustainability.
Banks and sustainability
The global ﬁnancial crisis of 2007–2009 led to calls for respon-
sible conduct of the ﬁnance industry (Cornett et al., 2016).
Politically motivated groups and non-governmental organizations
insist ﬁnancial institutions take responsibility for social ills such
as human rights violations and climate change by virtue of the
economic operations and activities they ﬁnance. For example,
Amnesty International (2016) requires banks commit to stop all
ﬁnancial activities related to illegal arms or arms destined to an
illegal use. Carbon Tracker Initiative (2017) urges pension funds
to divest from fossil fuel companies in order to facilitate the
transformation towards a carbon-neutral economic system.
Increasingly, the ﬁnancial sector tries to account for such calls.
Several initiatives have been set up to stimulate this debate and to
try to achieve ﬁnancial ﬁrms integrate responsibility in their
business model. For example, the Equator Principles address how
banks can account for social and environmental issues in project
ﬁnance, and the Principles for Responsible Investment stimulate
investors to use responsible investment to enhance returns and
improve risk management.
A responsible business community can mitigate the impact of
poor institutions and reduce corruption (Dixit, 2015). Further,
the interaction between global ﬁnancial markets and the economy
inﬂuences sustainable development (Huang, 2011). For individual
organizations, sustainability translates into corporate social
responsibility (Dahlsrud, 2008). Usually, economists measure
corporate sustainability via the performance of ﬁrms regarding
their environmental and social impact and policy, as well as their
governance (Chatterji et al., 2009; Ferrell et al., 2016). For
ﬁnancial institutions, this is problematic as they mediate within
the economy; their ﬁnancial products enable other agents to
produce their goods and services. The assets of banks are pre-
dominantly ﬁnancial assets, in contrast to those of non-ﬁnancial
companies (Tobin, 1987). Banks provide ﬁnancial services such as
lending, underwriting, guarantees, and investment to all kinds of
agents, which requires producing and processing information and
depends on network connections (Greenbaum and Thakor,
2007). As such, the banks do not have a direct effect on envir-
onmental and social characteristics, but only an indirect one via
their lending, investment and ﬁnancing decisions. In screening
potential borrowers, they come across the operations and pro-
spects of the counterparty and can inﬂuence decisions about
design of the projects they are to ﬁnance. Therefore, information
about their policies is crucial (Greenbaum and Thakor, 2007).
The economic system directly affects sustainability (e.g., pol-
lution, inequality) and uses resources (e.g., water, human capital,
energy). Hence, sustainable development is driven by the orga-
nization and efﬁciency of the economic system. The state of and
expectations regarding sustainable development inform banks’
sustainability policies. At the corporate level, sustainability
usually is proxied by environmental, social and governance
characteristics (Semenova and Hassel, 2015; Dorﬂeitner et al.,
2015; Friede et al., 2015). As intermediaries, banks cannot directly
inﬂuence sustainable development. However, in their ﬁnancial
services, they can account for environmental, social, and gov-
ernance characteristics and policies of ﬁrms and organizations in
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their ﬁnancing policy and decision. Further, at the aggregate and
macro-level, they interact with the economic system via their
balance sheets and their ﬁnancial market operations. To manage
their risks and to organize funding, they cooperate with other
ﬁnancial institutions. Financial authorities monitor and regulate
both individual banks and markets and the ﬁnancial system as a
whole (Greenbaum and Thakor, 2007).
Several country studies investigate sustainability in the ﬁnan-
cial industry (e.g., Simpson and Kohers, 2002 (US); Scholtens,
2007 (the Netherlands); Menassa, 2010 (Lebanon); Callado-
Munoz and Utrero-Gonzalez, 2011 (Spain); Uddin et al. (2012)
(Bangladesh); Saxena and Kohli, 2012 (India); Bolton, 2013 (US);
Kamal, 2013 (Egypt); Adewale and Rahmon, 2014 (Nigeria);
Malik and Nadeem, 2014 (Pakistan); Paulik et al., 2015 (Czech
Republic); Cornett et al., 2016 (US); Lins et al., 2017 (US)). This
literature shows wide variation in how it deals with sustainability:
from actual resource usage to generic ratings, and from topical
aspects to broad categories or even catch-all indicators. The
predominant conclusion is that sustainability results in ﬁnancial
outperformance (the studies of Scholtens (2007), Paulik et al.
(2015), and Gonenc and Scholtens (2019) being an exception).
Cornett et al. (2016) examine banks’ sustainability in the US in
the context of the global ﬁnancial crisis and establish they get
rewarded for socially responsible behavior.
In addition, there are several studies using an international
sample (for example, Chih et al., 2010; Soana, 2011; Wu and
Shen, 2013; Ciciretti et al., 2014; Hu and Scholtens, 2014; Mallin
et al., 2014; Jo et al., 2015; Aginer et al., 2016; Shen et al., 2016;
Wu et al., 2017). The results from multi-country studies generally
point in the same direction as those on individual countries. Chih
et al. (2010) provide an overview of the literature and conclude
that many key characteristics of social performance are to be
positively associated with ﬁnancial ratios and performance indi-
cators in the banking industry (see also Ioannou and Serafeim,
2015). Wu and Shen (2013) argue that the more banks engage
with sustainability, the better their ﬁnancial performance as
reﬂected in several bank efﬁciency and performance ratios. They
conﬁrm these ﬁndings in later research (Shen et al., 2016; Wu
et al., 2017). Ciciretti et al. (2014) suggest banks with higher
sustainability scores have lower cost of debt and equity. Mallin
et al., (2014) and Platonova et al. (2016) establish that Islamic
banking too shows the positive effects of responsible conduct. Jo
et al. (2015) argue banks’ environmental performance improves
their operational efﬁciency and as such results in better ﬁnancial
performance. Very diverse sustainability and ﬁnancial perfor-
mance variables are used in these studies. Further, there is sub-
stantial variation in the use of estimation methods. This criticism
is reminiscent of the critical reﬂection regarding the study of CSR
by Orlitzky et al. (2003), Margolis et al. (2009), and Dam and
Scholtens (2015). Only few studies explicitly address causality.
Those who do so show that it predominantly is sustainability that
precedes risk (Scholtens, 2008; Cornett et al., 2016; Bouslah et al.,
2018; Capelle-Blancard et al., 2019; Gonenc and Scholtens, 2019).
We aim to contribute to the literature about the interaction
between banks and sustainability by investigating how sustain-
ability relates to individual bank risk (default risk) and how it
affects ﬁnancial system risk (systemic risk).
Model
To investigate the relationships between bank risk and sustain-
ability, we rely on generic indirect measures of sustainability and
look into the inﬂuence of its constituting dimensions (i.e.,
environmental, social and governance factors). For bank risk, in
line with the literature (Boutin-Dufresne and Savaria, 2004;
Greenbaum and Thakor, 2007; Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision, 2015; Cornett et al., 2016; Bouslah et al., 2018), we
use different measures, namely their Z-Score (Berger et al., 2017)
and the standard deviation of the return on equity (Laeven and
Levine, 2009). We compute the Z-score as the sum of the return
on average assets (ROAA) and the capital-asset-ratio (CAR)
divided by the standard deviation of the return on assets over a
pre-speciﬁed period. It represents the number of standard
deviations by which returns have to decline in order to deplete a
bank’s equity capital. The variation in the return on equity relates
the net income of a bank to its equity (Laeven and Levine, 2009;
Berger et al., 2017).
We assess the systemic risk contribution by SRISK. SRISK is
the expected capital shortfall of a bank during a period of distress
in which the ﬁnancial market declines substantially, and shows
the amount of capital that a bank is expected to need in case of a
ﬁnancial crisis (Brownlees and Engle, 2016). SRISK measures the
capital shortfall of a bank conditional on a severe market decline,
and is a function of its size, leverage and risk. This metric can deal
with drawbacks from more conventional measures that are used
in this arena (see Dietz et al., 2016; Battiston et al., 2017). In
constructing the SRISK measure, we do not limit SRISK to a
threshold of zero (as in Acharya et al., 2012), but allow for
negative values too. This is because highly capitalized banks with
a large capital buffer can absorb systemic shocks that will reduce
the overall systemic risk in the system (Laeven et al., 2016).
Appendix 4 explains how SRISK is calculated.
Most of the literature about ﬁnancial and social performance
ﬁnds that it is ﬁnancial outperformance that drives social out-
performance (Margolis et al., 2009; Chih et al., 2010; Schröder,
2014; Dorﬂeitner et al., 2015; Friede et al., 2015). In contrast, as
discussed above, the few studies that speciﬁcally focus on the
relationship between ﬁrms’ risk and social, environmental and
governance performance detect that it usually is changes in the
latter that precede (changes) in risk (Scholtens, 2008; Sun and
Cui, 2014; Cornett et al., 2016; Bouslah et al., 2018). Therefore, we
opt for the risk measures as the dependent variable to be
explained by sustainability variables, next to others. However, we
will also show model estimations with social performance being
explained with the help of risk.
We include a large number of controls. First, we include bank-
speciﬁc variables such as size of assets held, capital buffer,
funding, non-interest income, and deposits. Second, we have
ﬁnancial market size to control for the ﬁnancial system. In
addition, GDP growth, public debt, and inﬂation control for the
economy. Time ﬁxed effect account for bank regulation and
supervision. The controls are motivated by the way in which
banks operate (see Beale et al., 2011; López-Espinosa et al., 2013;
Hull, 2018), and are in line with other studies that investigate
social and ﬁnancial performance (Laeven and Levine, 2009; Chih
et al., 2010; Friede et al., 2015; Cornett et al., 2016; Lins et al.,
2017; Bouslah et al., 2018; Capelle-Blancard et al., 2019). We do
not include additional institutional features as suggested by
Waddock and Graves (1997) because our sample banks operate
on the basis of the same type of institutions and regulations in the
Euro area of the European Union. They all are subject to identical
monetary and prudential supervision, operate on liberalized
banking markets, and face the same regulation regarding payment
systems, ﬁnancial services and capital mobility.
Thus, ﬁrst, we investigate the relationship between banks’
sustainability and individual bank default risk, in which the fol-
lowing setup is applied:
Default riski;t ¼ αþ β1Sustainabilityi;t1 þ β2Controlsi;t1
þ β3Controlsc;t1 þ ωt þ γi þ εi;t ;
ð1Þ
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where the measure for individual bank default risk refers to bank i
at time t, Sustainability to the prior year’s sustainability rating of
bank i, controls include bank-speciﬁc characteristics of bank i at
time t− 1, such as tier-1 capital ratio, deposit ratio, non-interest
income, and short-term funding, and country-speciﬁc char-
acteristics of country c at time t− 1, such as GDP growth, public
debt ratio, inﬂation, and stock market capitalization. ωt are time
ﬁxed effects, γi bank ﬁxed effects and εi,t represents the error
term. In a sensitivity analysis, we swap Sustainability and Default
Risk to ﬁnd out whether speciﬁcation (1) is valid indeed.
The second regression model accounts for the relationship
between sustainability and a bank’s contribution to systemic risk:
Systemic risk contributioni;t ¼ αþ β1Sustainabilityi;t1
þ β2Controlsi;t1 þ β3Controlsc;t1 þ ωt þ γi þ εi;t ;
ð2Þ
here, the dependent variable is systemic risk for bank i at time t.
The bank i and country c controls are the same as those in Eq. (1):
bank-speciﬁc controls are tier-1 capital ratio, deposit ratio, non-
interest income, and short-term funding, country-speciﬁc con-
trols are GDP growth, public debt ratio, inﬂation, and stock
market capitalization. As bank assets appear to be non-stationary
after running a Fisher unit root test, we transform it into sta-
tionary variables to make sure the model is correctly speciﬁed. As
with model (1), we will also swap sustainability and systemic risk
for sensitivity purposes.
We estimate models (1) and (2) using a ﬁxed effects regres-
sions, based on the results of the Hausman test. We cluster
standard errors at the bank level to correct for heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation. Time-ﬁxed effects are included to account
for time trends and those of the Global Financial Crisis. In
addition, the explanatory variables are lagged by one year to help
control for potential endogeneity. This lag can be motivated by
theoretical and practical reasons. The former relates to the
argument of Garcia-Castro et al. (2010) that lagging by one year
controls for previous year’s performance effects on subsequent
performance or changes in strategy. Further, there is no theore-
tical reason as to why longer lags would have an impact. The
practical reason relates to the limited time-span of the data series.
Using longer lag-lengths would considerably reduce the number
of observations.
Data
Our sample (See Appendix 1) relates to banks situated in Euro
countries starting January 2002 until 2016. They are subject to the
same regime of monetary and prudential supervision (as such, we
do not face the problem of differences in relevant institutions
affecting the results, see Waddock and Graves, 1997). As to
sustainability, it is unfortunate that there are only very few
independently audited and veriﬁed sustainability reports. Several
commercial rating agencies produce assessments of ﬁrms’ cor-
porate social responsibility. They do so by assessing ﬁrms
regarding policies and some resource use and emissions data. The
academic literature acknowledges the drawbacks of using these
data (Garcia-Castro et al., 2010; Semenova and Hassel, 2015;
Dorﬂeitner et al., 2015). In particular, ratings do not inform about
sustainability as such and tend to focus on policies instead of
performance. However, as of yet, there is no alternative. There-
fore, we rely on Thomson Reuters DataStream to obtain infor-
mation about corporate social responsibility from their ASSET4
database. This used in several other academic studies too (Dor-
ﬂeitner et al., 2015; Friede et al., 2015). We opted for this database
as it is part of our university’s subscription to a much more
encompassing database. As the sustainability score is the main
variable of interest, we exclude banks without such ratings. The
overall rating comprises an environmental, social and corporate
governance pillar and is an equally weighted score (see Appendix
3). The ASSET4 database holds publicly available information
about 226 indicators to create an integrated view of corporate
performance. The environmental pillar consists of the categories
emission reduction, product innovation and resource reduction.
The social pillar consists of the categories community, diversity,
employment quality, health and safety, human rights, product
responsibility, and training and development. The corporate
governance pillar contains the following categories: board func-
tions, board structure, compensation policy, shareholder rights,
and vision and strategy. The sustainability score we use is an
aggregate equally weighted measure of the three pillars. After
matching Thomson Reuters ASSET4 ratings with the banks, our
ﬁnal sample includes 43 banks from 10 countries. This includes
all banks in the Euro area that qualify as system banks, i.e., banks
that are most relevant for the global ﬁnancial system. As such, we
study the most important banks.
Financial data are from Datastream and World Bank World
Development Indicators, as are the bank-speciﬁc and country-
speciﬁc control variables. The data are subject to relevant lim-
itations. First, as mentioned, sustainability ratings data are not
independently veriﬁed and audited. Further, most data is only
available on a yearly basis. Therefore, we can calculate the mea-
sures for bank default risk only for a small sample, which affects
the estimation of our systemic risk measure. As a ﬁnancial
breakdown occurs suddenly, yearly data cannot accurately assess
the effect on a bank its systemic risk contribution. We look for-
ward to be able to both more accurate and granular data to
improve the analysis. Appendix 2 gives an overview of the deﬁ-
nition of the variables used and provides their source.
Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics. The SRISK measure
show that this is the only variable displayed in Euros. As this
makes interpretation of its coefﬁcient complicated, the percentage
change of SRISK will be used in regressions. Comparing the Z-
Scores to the US bank sample of Berger et al. (2017), our mean
value is 57.456, whereas they have calculated a value of 36.053,
suggesting that the European banks are more stable. The Sus-
tainability score ranges from 13.45 to 288.14, with a mean of
186.412.
Bank risk and sustainability. We estimate the effect of sustain-
ability on bank default risk with different risk measures to test our
ﬁrst hypothesis, which holds that sustainability affects bank
default risk. Table 2 presents the results. It shows a signiﬁcant
association between the sustainability score and bank default risk.
The estimation results for our ﬁrst risk metric (Z-Score) reveal
that a bank’s sustainability signiﬁcantly associates with lower
default risk: An increase of the sustainability score by one unit is
associated with an increase of the bank’s Z-Score by 0.303 units.
The sustainability score negatively relates to the standard devia-
tion of the return on equity, being our second risk measure, but
this is only marginally signiﬁcant. This suggests that an increase
in the sustainability score by one unit is to be associated with a
decrease of the standard deviation of the return on equity by
0.001, implying a decrease in bank default risk. We conclude that
in banking, sustainability negatively relates to default risk. This
ﬁnding is consistent with previous studies (Oikonomou et al.,
2012; Sun and Cui, 2014; Capelle-Blancard et al., 2019).
Next, we associate bank sustainability with systemic risk. Table
3 presents the estimation results of our model as to how banks’
sustainability scores relate to their systemic risk contribution. We
observe that higher sustainability scores coincides with signiﬁ-
cantly lower systemic risk contributions. More speciﬁcally, an
increase of a bank’s sustainability score by one unit associates
with a reduction of its systemic risk contribution by 1.522
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics
N Mean Stdev. Min Max Skewness Kurtosis
Z-Score 536 57.456 97.464 −2.403 1189.020 5.275 45.193
Stdev. ROE 580 0.168 0.573 0.000 5.869 6.362 49.423
MES 605 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.010 1.762 6.787
SRISK (x€107) 600 1.29 2.71 −4.52 16.1 2.504 9.793
Sustainability 562 185.870 80.307 13.450 288.140 −0.660 2.099
Size 622 18.701 1.400 14.708 21.509 −0.088 2.897
Tier-1 ratio (%) 557 10.029 3.081 −7.300 21.400 −0.169 6.468
Deposit ratio 579 0.440 0.152 0.023 0.831 −0.593 3.466
Short-term funding 622 0.189 0.102 0.000 0.589 0.806 4.046
Non-interest income 586 0.569 0.863 −0.157 11.783 7.795 81.504
GDP growth rate (%) 645 0.883 3.218 −9.132 26.276 1.760 20.411
Public debt to GDP 532 83.895 33.284 26.920 151.824 0.107 2.072
Inﬂation rate (%) 645 1.780 1.428 −4.480 4.880 −0.557 3.786
Market capitalization 623 52.655 24.985 11.740 121.660 0.533 2.484
Note: For the deﬁnition of the variables, see Appendix 2 and 3
Table 2 Bank default risk and sustainability
Z-Score Z-Score Stdev. ROE
Full model Full model robust-cluster Full model robust-cluster
Sustainability 0.303** (0.142) 0.303* (0.154) −0.001* (0.001)
Size 14.813 (25.663) 14.813 (23.502) −0.186* (0.106)
Tier-1 capital ratio 2.511 (2.810) 2.511 (2.893) −0.024** (0.011)
Deposit ratio −87.834 (81.290) −87.834 (115.657) −1.227*** (0.420)
Non-interest income 7.138 (17.153) 7.138 (18.798) −0.113** (0.051)
Short-term funding −167.629** (77.524) −167.629* (89.988) −0.465 (0.280)
GDP growth rate 1.595 (1.920) 1.595 (1.269) −0.013 (0.010)
Public debt to GDP −0.075 (0.447) −0.075 (0.480) 0.000 (0.001)
Inﬂation rate 2.264 (6.817) 2.264 (7.910) −0.022 (0.063)
Market capitalization −0.308 (0.581) −0.308 (0.551) −0.006 (0.004)
Time ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes
Bank ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.138 0.138 0.174
Note: For the exact deﬁnition of the variables, see Appendix 2. Appendix 1 reports the sample banks. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year. Robust standard errors are reported in the
parentheses
*indicates signiﬁcance at the ten percent level
**indicates signiﬁcance at the ﬁve percent level and
***indicates signiﬁcance at the one percent level
Table 3 Systemic risk contribution and sustainability
SRISK % SRISK% SRISK%
Full model Full model robust-cluster Full model robust-cluster
Sustainability −1.552* (0.921) −1.552* (0.855) −1.457** (0.655)
Risk (Z-Score) −0.269 (0.234)
Size 38.433 (163.509) 38.433 (140.065) 75.023 (85.580)
Tier-1 capital ratio −7.044 (18.924) −7.044 (16.219) −3.645 (15.287)
Deposit ratio −286.236 (522.864) −286.236 (471.565) −255.494 (477.694)
Non-interest income −42.932 (110.353) −42.932 (52.857) −37.768 (60.078)
Short-term funding 125.656 (510.723) 125.656(406.504) −65.981(389.476)
GDP growth rate −17.966(12.601) −17.966 (16.671) −20.890 (17.318)
Public debt to GDP 1.483 (2.955) 1.483(2.657) 0.847(2.428)
Inﬂation rate 103.288** (44.182) 103.288** (47.074) 98.524**(44.453)
Market capitalization −12.367*** (3.667) −12.367* (6.603) −10.101 (6.159)
Time ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes
Bank ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-Squared 0.092 0.092 0.087
Note: All explanatory variables are lagged by one year. Robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses
*indicates signiﬁcance at the ten percent level
**indicates signiﬁcance at the ﬁve percent level and
***indicates signiﬁcance at the one percent level
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percentage points. As such, this suggests that banks’ sustainability
is inversely related with their systemic risk contribution.
To account for the sensitivity of the results, we engage in
additional checks. First, we run each model with the three
individual sustainability pillars (environmental, social, govern-
ance) separately on our main dependent variables for the ﬁrst and
second hypothesis. It shows in Table 4 that the main dimension
regarding the signiﬁcant relationship of the Z-Score and
sustainability in the banking industry is the social pillar as it is
signiﬁcant at a 5% level, whereas the other two pillars are not
signiﬁcant. This makes sense because the direct environmental
footprint of ﬁnancial institutions is limited and bank governance
is highly institutionalized (Basel Committee on Banking Super-
vision, 2015). The social dimension might be impactful as it
closely relates to the type of business the banks engage in, which
is highly reliant on human and social capital. This ﬁnding is in
line with that of Lins et al. (2017) for non-ﬁnancial business.
Further, relating to ordering effects, we again estimate model
(1) but now the dependent variable and the main variable of
interest are swapped. That is, we estimate if sustainability is
explained by (one year lagged) risk. The results are in Appendix 5.
It shows that both risk measures do not signiﬁcantly associate
with the sustainability measure. This is in line with previous
studies regarding the relationship between sustainability and
ﬁnancial risk (Scholtens, 2008; Sun and Cui, 2014). Further, we
re-estimate model (2) with sustainability as the dependent and
systemic risk as the explanatory variable. This is reported in
Appendix 6. It shows that SRISK has a no signiﬁcant association
with Sustainability.
The regression results for the systemic risk measure also show
signiﬁcance in the case of the social pillar; the environmental
pillar is only marginally signiﬁcant. Banking to a large extent is
pure people business and depends on access to networks
(Greenbaum and Thakor, 2007). Then, having a committed and
motivated workforce can make a substantial difference in keeping
customers and in attracting new ones. Again, the governance
score does not have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on bank default risk or
systemic risk contribution. This may relate to the fact that there is
very little leeway for banks in this respect, due to extensive
regulation by monetary and ﬁnancial authorities.
We also investigated if outliers inﬂuence the results and
potentially give biased results. To deal with the possibility of a
bias in our results, we remove extreme values of the sustainability
score by taking out the top and bottom 1% of the scores. It
appears the results remain robust to removing outliers.
Potential for sustainability in mitigating bank risk. Increas-
ingly, human-driven processes interact with global social-
ecological connectivity and exhibit cross-scale relationships. In
this respect, we study whether banks’ sustainability interacts with
their default risk and their systemic risk. Banks are intermediaries
and it is not clear how their operations affect sustainability.
Therefore, we rely on information about banks’ performance
regarding environmental, social and governance characteristics,
i.e., their sustainability score, which reﬂects in their lending
operations. We study 43 banks headquartered in the Euro area for
the period 2002–2016.
We establish that sustainability negatively associates with bank
risk: Banks with high sustainability scores have signiﬁcantly less
default risk. This holds for different proxies of default risk. We
also show that a high sustainability score goes hand in hand with
a lower systemic risk contribution. We conclude that sustain-
ability coincides with lower bank risk and that it associates with
less systemic risk. Several robustness tests conﬁrm these results.
Interestingly, separating the sustainability score into the three
individual pillars shows that the social pillar is the main driver of
the decrease in bank default risk and its systemic risk
contribution. This is in line with the intuition that banking is a
service industry; highly relying on human capital. Its direct
environmental footprint is limited and it faces severe regulation
and supervision regarding the corporate board, which reduces the
scope to vary governance.
These novel ﬁndings complement the extant debate about the
relationship between ﬁnancial performance and sustainability in
the international banking industry (Boutin-Dufresne and Savaria,
2004; Bouslah et al., 2018). The results on bank default risk align
with the ﬁndings of the positive effects of responsibility of non-
ﬁnancial ﬁrms (Luo and Bhattacharya, 2009; Sun and Cui, 2014),
whereas our results regarding systemic risk contribution provide
a novel insight regarding the impact of sustainability on banking.
The ﬁndings of this paper have important implications. First,
the result that better sustainability is to be associated with lower
default risk and systemic risk contribution enhances our under-
standing of what makes up bank risk. Further research should
Table 4 Individual responsibility pillars, bank risk and systemic risk
Z-Score Z-Score Z-Score SRISK% SRISK% SRISK%
Full Model Robust-
cluster
Full model robust-cluster Full model robust-
cluster
Full model robust-
cluster
Full model robust-
cluster
Full model robust-
cluster
Sustainability:
environmental
0.312 (0.216) −3.698* (1.896)
Sustainability: social 0.769** (0.355) −3.596** (1.665)
Sustainability:
governance
0.546 (0.357) −0.267 (1.924)
Risk (Z-Score) −0.305 (0.239) −0.261 (0.227) −0.323 (0.247)
Size 25.065 (21.495) 15.839 (22.638) 26.088 (21.363) 70.168 (92.240) 73.578 (91.026) −11.142 (85.975)
Tier-1 capital ratio 2.031 (2.828) 2.810 (2.850) 2.523 (2.866) −1.169 (14.890) −4.473 (15.758) −0.000 (14.510)
Deposit ratio −82.423 (115.668) −74.277 (109.304) −80.442 (114.987) −216.306 (465.978) −324.897 (493.975) −323.016 (498.439)
Non-interest income 5.721 (19.944) 8.643 (19.279) 6.264 (18.468) −30.324 (58.044) −47.153 (62.179) −32.089 (60.679)
Short-term funding −141.921 (84.656) −165.732* (86.587) −168.550* (91.878) −160.728 (398.742) −110.304 (399.369) −159.327 (439.804)
GDP growth rate 1.846 (1.253) 1.399 (1.272) 1.770 (1.251) −21.834 (16.112) −20.242 (17.903) −22.021 (17.808)
Public debt to GDP −0.137 (0.511) 0.022 (0.467) −0.092 (0.491) 1.301 (2.496) 0.358 (2.394) 0.983 (2.426)
Inﬂation rate 3.772 (7.709) 1.923 (7.828) 2.993 (7.909) 92.936** (42.646) 100.591** (45.315) 90.543** (42.682)
Market capitalization −0.313 (0.569) −0.278 (0.545) −0.379 (0.541) −10.334* (6.098) −10.206 (6.095) −10.125 (6.124)
Time ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-Squared 0.120 0.140 0.133 0.089 0.087 0.081
Note: All explanatory variables are lagged by one year. Robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses
*indicates signiﬁcance at the ten percent level
**indicates signiﬁcance at the ﬁve percent level and
***indicates signiﬁcance at the one percent level
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examine how banks can improve sustainability to mitigate risk.
This could help banks strengthen risk management, which is of
great importance to society. Second, the positive role of banks’
social responsibility in relation to their systemic risk contribution
suggests ﬁnancial authorities should integrate sustainability into
their supervisory mechanisms. Further research to determine as
to how exactly sustainability drives risks in the ﬁnancial system
will help central banks and other supervisory authorities in their
quest to lower systemic risk and to mitigate the effect of future
banking crises. Lastly, our study shows that policies regarding the
promotion of sustainability need to account for industry speciﬁcs.
Data availability
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